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Abstract
This paper deals with a Niskanen type of public-procurement agency. It is shown
that the procurement game should be separated into an investment game and a
project game, the ﬁrst game to be played before nature determines the actual real-
izations of beneﬁt and costs of the project, the second game to be played afterward.
In the ﬁrst game the relationship-speciﬁc investments of agency and seller are de-
termined, in the second game the decision on the production of the project is taken.
In contrast to many other incomplete-contract papers, in our Niskanen setting it
is meaningless to write one and only one contract which refers to both investment
and production. Welfare-optimal procurement of the project can be attained under
relatively weak assumptions; welfare-optimal investments of the seller (and only of
the seller) may result under special circumstances; welfare-optimal investments of
both agency and seller cannot be reached.
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This paper deals with the purchase of a public project. The parliament sponsors
a procurement agency which, in turn, pays a private seller who provides his ser-
vices. As in Niskanen’s (1971,1975) model,1 the parliament is willing to appropriate
money for the completion of the project up to its evaluation of the social beneﬁt of
the project. The agency is a budget-maximizing bureaucrat.2 It wants to maximize
its power which can be achieved best if it spends as many dollars as possible. The
private seller is a proﬁt maximizer. Given these objectives of parliament, agency
and seller, we expect the result to be far from welfare optimality. However, in this
paper we show that under particular circumstances welfare optimality may result.
At the beginning of their relationship the procurement agency and the private seller
face a situation of uncertainty about the actual realizations of beneﬁt and costs of
the project. However, the probabilities of higher beneﬁt and of lower costs can be
inﬂuenced by relationship-speciﬁc investments of the seller and of the agency. The
seller’s investments consist of speciﬁc innovative activities, for instance the develop-
ment of a particular technology for military interceptor planes, or a special design for
a particular building for elderly handicapped people. However, the agency is also
interested in investing because the parliament’s beneﬁt of the project determines
the agency’s budget and, therefore, the agency directly beneﬁts from an increase
in the probability of higher beneﬁts. The speciﬁc investments of the agency typ-
ically refer to complementary goods which are essential in ensuring the success of
the project. By way of example, one can think of investment in the development of
a new approach control radar which makes landing of a military interceptor plane
more secure, or the development of special infrastructure if a new hospital is to be
built.
The seller provides two services: his speciﬁc investments and the production of the
project. We shall assume that it is the same seller who provides both services.3 This
is the most interesting problem. Otherwise, in a ﬁrst stage seller A would be paid
1For a simple explanation of Niskanen’s model see, for instance, Mueller (1989), pp. 250-254.
2The assumption of a budget-maximizing procurement agency is in contrast to several other
incomplete-contract models on public procurement, for instance B¨ os and L¨ ulfesmann (1996) and
B¨ os (2000), which assume a welfare-maximizing procurement agency.
3In various public-procurement guidelines it is forbidden that the same ﬁrm provides both the
R&D investments and the completion of the project. These provisions aim at a promotion of
competition because many smaller ﬁrms may be specialized in R&D or in project implementation.
1for the investment costs and in a second stage seller B would be paid for the project,
and these two stages would not be connected. It is just the connection between the
investment and the project stage which constitutes the really interesting problem:
since the relationship-speciﬁc investments have to be made before nature’s draw,
the investors face a hold-up problem.4 The ﬁnal distribution of rents will only be
determined after nature’s draw, when it is ﬁnally decided whether the project is car-
ried out or not. However, at this moment the costs of the speciﬁc investments are
sunk and no party can argue that it deserves a higher share of the ex-post surplus
because of its high speciﬁc investments. This is anticipated by the agency and the
seller and constitutes a tendency toward underinvestment.
If only one seller provides his services to the agency, it seems natural that only one
contract is written which refers to both relationship-speciﬁc investments and the
production of the project. However, in our model this is not meaningful because
of the procurement agency’s Niskanen-type of behavior. In our setting, agency and
seller should write two contracts: one with respect to the investments of the seller,
and one with respect to the production of the project.5 These two contracts are
supported by two budgets which are appropriated by the parliament: an investment
budget and a project budget. Why is this the only meaningful setting in our model?
Consider, for the sake of the argument, that agency and seller write a single contract
which refers to both investment and production of the seller. A particular problem
arises when it comes to the question how the production costs should be taken into
account in this single contract. The procurement agency must never contractually
promise to pay a price which may exceed its budgetary possibilities at the moment
when the project ﬁnally is carried out. Therefore, the procurement contract cannot
stipulate a ﬁxed ex-ante price unless the agency chooses a meaninglessly low price
which would correspond to the lowest budget the agency could expect after the draw
of nature. Since the agency is a budget maximizer, it will never choose this low-price
strategy, but will force the seller to accept a price which exhausts the total budget
as it will be set by the parliament after the draw of nature.6 Of course, this is fully
4The hold-up problem was ﬁrst articulated by Klein et al. (1978) and by Williamson (1975,
1979).
5In the practical application the procurement agency should enter into a public-private part-
nership, writing a long-term skeleton contract which states that the parties’ total relationship
consists of two short-term contracts: if the investment contract is satisfactorily executed, agency
and contractor continue in their cooperation and write the project contract.
6Any project budget which is set before the draw of nature would be adjusted by downward
or upward renegotiations after the draw of nature, because the parliament would not be willing
to pay more than its actual beneﬁt from the project (downward renegotiation) and the agency,
2anticipated by the seller. Accordingly, it is not meaningful for the parties to write
an ex-ante contract which stipulates one and only one price which is to be paid after
the completion of the project and refers to both investment and production costs of
the seller. The agency would insist in stipulating a stochastic ex-ante price which
would be equal to the total budget appropriated by the parliament after the draw
of nature. As a compensation for accepting such a stochastic price the seller would
have to be given the right to rescind the contract after nature’s draw, that is, when
he ﬁnally learns the actual price and the actual production costs, he would be al-
lowed to withdraw from the contract if the price does not cover the production costs.
However, if ex ante a stochastic price is stipulated and the seller has an ex-post right
of withdrawal, this is equivalent to a situation without any contractual arrangement
about the project price. The only meaningful contract at the beginning of the re-
lationship between agency and seller is an incomplete contract which stipulates a
lump-sum payment. If this payment is positive, it is a compensation for the speciﬁc
investments of the seller. If it is negative, the seller has to pay for his participation
in the procurement game (and he will be willing to pay if his speciﬁc-investment
costs are lower than the expected proﬁt from the production stage). The contract
about the completion of the project is only written after the draw of nature. Then
the procurement agency oﬀers a project price and the seller may decide not to sign
such a contract if this price does not cover his production costs.
Summarizing, in this paper the relationship between parliament and agency is char-
acterized by two budgets. The investment budget refers to the investment costs of
the agency and of the seller. The project budget ﬁnances the costs of the completion
of the project. Similarly, the relationship between agency and seller is governed by
two contracts. The investment contract refers to the lump-sum payment stipulated
at the beginning of the relationship. The project contract refers to the completion
of the project.
This setting is in contrast to the usual theory of incomplete contracts, such as Hart
and Moore (1988), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994), and N¨ oldeke and Schmidt
(1995). In these papers the buyer and the seller write one and only one contract at
the beginning of their relationship, that is, before the agents’ uncertainty about ben-
eﬁt and costs is dissolved by a draw of nature. Typically, in this ex-ante contract two
knowing the actual realization of the parliament’s beneﬁt will always go for a budget which fully
exploits the parliament’s willingness to pay (upward renegotiation). Anticipating this, the only
meaningful procedure for the parliament is to set the project budget after the draw of nature.
3prices are stipulated: a price p1 to be paid if the project is completed, and a default
price p0 if this is not the case. After nature has revealed the actual realizations of
beneﬁt and costs, the prices p1 or p0 may be renegotiated. In contrast, in our paper
the two prices are contracted upon at diﬀerent stages of the game. p0 is stipulated
in a contract which is signed when the procurement agency starts with the planning
of the particular project; it is not a default price, but is paid or encashed by the
agency when the investment stage of the game ends. p1 is stipulated in a contract
written after nature has revealed the actual realizations of beneﬁt and costs. The
budget-maximizing attitude of the bureaucratic procurement agency implies that it
always fully exhausts the parliament’s budget; and since both contracts are written
under certainty, neither agency nor seller face any incentive to change any price at
a later stage: there is no renegotiation in our model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the sequencing of the game,
the observability and veriﬁability assumptions, a detailed description of the interplay
between the parliament and the procurement agency, and, ﬁnally, the second-best
benchmark which serves as the basis of comparison for the actually played game.
Then, in section 3 we deal with the equilibrium analysis. We begin with the project
game, where parliament and agency determine the price to be paid for the project,
and the seller decides whether to sign the project contract or not. Subsequently,
we analyze the investment game, where agency and seller choose their relationship-
speciﬁc investments on the basis of an investment contract which, in turn, is based
on the parliament’s investment budget. A brief summary concludes.
42 The model
2.1 Beneﬁts, costs, and investments
If the public project is carried out, the parliament’s beneﬁt is B. At the beginning
of the game, the actual beneﬁt is not yet known. This is modelled by assuming that
the actual realization of beneﬁt is determined by a draw of nature. If the project is
not carried out, its beneﬁt is zero. The production costs of the project are denoted
by C; there are no costs if the project is not carried out. At the beginning of the
game the costs are stochastic; nature draws the actual cost realization at a later
stage of the game. There are many possible realizations of beneﬁt and costs which
can be ordered as follows:
B = B1 < ... < Bi < ... < BI = B; I ≥ 2, (1)
C = C1 > ... > Cj > ... > CJ = C; J ≥ 2. (2)
Nature draws the actual realizations of beneﬁt and costs from the above lists of
deterministic variables. The probability that a particular beneﬁt or cost realization
is drawn depends on relationship-speciﬁc investments a of the agency and e of the
seller. For convenience, these investments are normalized to the zero-one interval.
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j is increasing in j. A particular
choice of investment determines a linear combination of two probability distributions
and our assumptions imply that higher investments increase expected beneﬁt and
reduce expected costs, respectively. From the deﬁnitions of the probability distri-
butions π(a) and σ(e) it follows directly that the ﬁrst derivatives are constant and





















j = 0. (5)
The relationship-speciﬁc investments are costly. We deﬁne investment-cost func-
tions µ(a) and ψ(e) and assume that both functions are convex in their arguments
and that the Inada conditions are fulﬁlled.
52.2 The stages of the game
The sequencing of events is illustrated in table 1.
date 0 investment budget
date 1 investment contract, investment game
agency’s investments
date 2 seller’s investments
date 3 draw of nature
date 4 project budget
date 5 project contract project game
date 6 completion of project
Table 1: Sequencing of events
At date 0 the investment game is opened: the parliament appropriates the invest-
ment budget b ≥ 0. A negative budget cannot be appropriated because of the
procurement agency’s limited liability. This investment budget covers the costs of
the agency’s investments µ(a) and a lump-sum payment p0 to be encashed or paid
by the seller. This investment budget is split into its two components by a decision
of the procurement agency at date 1. Since choosing µ(a) implies the choice of a,
the agency acts as a Stackelberg leader in the investment game; it chooses its in-
vestments prior to the seller. The agency’s decision on how to split the investment
budget into µ(a) and p0 is the basis of the investment contract which is signed by the
seller unless the stipulated lump sum p0 violates his participation constraint. This
constraint is based on the agency’s commitment not to choose another seller for the
project game which deﬁnitely must be given at date 1.7 Then, at date 2 the seller
chooses his relationship-speciﬁc investments. The agency pays or encashes the lump
sum p0. The investment game ends. Only then, at date 3 the actual realizations
of beneﬁt and costs are determined by a draw of nature. The uncertainty is thus
dissolved and at date 4 the project game is opened: the parliament sets the project
budget according to nature’s draw. The agency fully extracts this budget which,
therefore, is available for the seller as the price to be paid for the completed project.
On the basis of this price and his knowledge of the actual costs at date 5 the seller
decides whether to sign a contract about the completion of the project. If he makes
7Recall footnote 5 above.
6a negative decision, the game ends. Otherwise, at date 6 the project is produced,
and the seller is paid for the completed project.8
2.3 Observability and veriﬁability
The supports of B and C, and the probabilities π(a) and σ(e) are common knowl-
edge, that is, they are known to parliament, procurement agency and seller. The
same holds for the investment-cost functions.
The actual realizations of beneﬁt and costs, as determined by nature, are observable
as follows: The beneﬁt B is known to the parliament and to the procurement agency,
it does not matter whether it is also known to the seller. The costs C, however, in
this model are assumed to be private knowledge of the seller, that is, the producer
is the only one who knows the production costs. In Niskanen’s original two-person
model of a sponsor and a bureaucrat, the bureaucrat produces the good and only
he knows the costs. We have extended Niskanen’s model to a three-person setting,
and it seems natural to assume that, once again, only the producer knows the costs.
Note, however, that the results of the paper remain unchanged if we assume that
both seller and procurement agency know the costs (as long as the parliament does
not know them).9 The actual amount of relationship-speciﬁc investments which the
agents choose may be private or public information; this does not inﬂuence the re-
sults of the paper.
The above informational assumptions show that the parliament does not need the
agency because it is better informed about the production costs. However, the
agency is the only one which is able to prepare the project by appropriate relationship-
speciﬁc investments. (Moreover, there is always the usual justiﬁcation that in prac-
tice a parliament cannot do everything itself; it always needs a special agency which
looks into the particulars of a public project.)
Let us next turn to the veriﬁability assumptions which are important because any
contract can only be conditioned on variables which are veriﬁable before a court.
In this paper we assume that the relationship-speciﬁc investments a and e are non-
veriﬁable since they are eﬀort levels which contain many subjective elements. We
8Disputes on delivery and on payments would be decided upon after the end of a game, either
the investment game or the project game. However, in the subgame-perfect equilibrium no such
disputes occur.
9This is proved at the end of subsection 3.1 below.
7also assume that the costs C are non-veriﬁable. Usually, cost padding or possible
accounting tricks are taken as a justiﬁcation for the assumption of non-veriﬁable
costs. And, as usual in most models on incomplete contracts, we assume that B is
non-veriﬁable. After all, the evaluation of the beneﬁt of the project is a subjective
attitude of the parliament. Note, however, that a budget of B/(1+λ) is an oﬃcially
published ﬁgure, which therefore clearly can be veriﬁed before a court. Furthermore,
the completion of the project and all payments are veriﬁable.
2.4 The interplay between parliament and procurement agency
Parliament and procurement agency are modelled according to Niskanen (1971,
1975). A modern formulation of the Niskanen model has to impute to the par-
liament a lexicographic preference ordering with respect to allocative eﬃciency and
payments.10 The parliament ﬁrst wants to attain allocative eﬃciency, therefore at
date 4, it favors the completion of the project iﬀ
Bi ≥ (1 + λ)Cj, (6)
where λ are the shadow costs of public funds. If the project is completed, its
costs Cj have been realized. Unfortunately, when it has to appropriate the project
budget at date 4, the parliament cannot observe the actual cost realization which
is private information of the seller. Since payments are only second-ranked part
of the parliament’s lexicographic preference ordering, however, it does not bother
if it has to pay more than the actual costs as long as the ﬁrst-ranked objective of
allocative eﬃciency is not violated.11 Therefore, the parliament is willing to spend






The parliament’s lexicographic preference ordering is exploited by the budget-maxi-
mizing procurement agency. Since the agency wants to spend as many dollars as
possible, it fully extracts the parliament’s willingness to pay: the agency makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the parliament which equates the budget to the parlia-
ment’s social evaluation of the project. (This take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer is the core of
10For the use of such a preference function see also B¨ os and L¨ ulfesmann (1996). A precise
formulation of the government agency’s utility function would be as follows: one must deﬁne P =
P(x,y), where x denotes the level of allocative eﬃciency and y the payments to the procurement
agency. In this formulation, lexicographic preferences over these two arguments can be expressed
as follows: G > e G ⇐⇒ (a) x = e x and y < e y or (b) x > e x.
11Therefore, the parliament does not implement any direct mechanism in order to induce the
seller to reveal the actual cost realization.
8Niskanen’s theory of bureaucratic behavior.) The parliament accepts this oﬀer and
appropriates a budget of Bi/(1 + λ) dollars conditional upon the completion of the
project.
Let us now step back and consider the interplay between parliament and procure-
ment agency at date 0, when the investment budget is to be appropriated. The ﬁrst-
ranked part of the parliament’s lexicographic preference ordering aims at eﬃcient
investments of both procurement agency and seller. The parliament anticipates the
subgame-perfect continuation of the game, in particular the splitting of the invest-
ment budget by the agency (b = µ(a)+p0), and the ﬁnal decision on the completion
of the project. Since payments rank only second, the parliament would be willing
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with respect to a and e. Note, however, that the parliament has to consider the
agency’s limited liability which requires b ≥ 0.
2.5 A benchmark
In this subsection we consider a fully informed parliament which wants to maximize
welfare. It does not engage in public procurement, but ‘does it alone.’ Both invest-
ment costs and project costs are born by the parliament and paid from distortionary
taxation. Therefore, the shadow costs of public funds must be taken into account.
This implies that we have a second-best benchmark.
Applying backward induction, let us ﬁrst deﬁne project eﬃciency which refers to
the decisions made with respect to the completion of the project. Project eﬃciency
requires that the project is carried out if and only if this increases welfare. Since we
deal with procurement of an indivisible good, the project, let q = 1 and q = 0 be
the quantities to be procured. Therefore, project eﬃciency requires:
q
∗ = 1 ⇔ Bi ≥ Cj (1 + λ), (9)
q
∗ = 0 ⇔ Bi < Cj (1 + λ), (10)
where Bi and Cj are the realizations of beneﬁt and costs as determined by the draw
of nature. The investment costs are sunk at this stage and, therefore, do not inﬂu-
ence the parliament’s decision.
9Second, we deﬁne investment eﬃciency which refers to the welfare-optimal choice
of the investments a and e. Anticipating project eﬃciency we have:
(a
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We obtain the following ﬁrst-order conditions:


























These conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for a unique and interior solution
{a∗,e∗} > 0.12 Note that the benchmark implies that at date 0 a general eﬃ-
ciency constraint W ≥ 0 holds. Therefore, at date 0 the expected net value of the
project should be weakly positive, otherwise the project should not be started at
all.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 The project game
At date 5, the agency knows the project budget which allows for an expenditure of
pi dollars for the completed project. The agency is always interested in having the
project carried out because otherwise its budget is reduced to zero. Therefore, it
wants to spend the pi dollars which the parliament’s project budget allows to spend.
The agency is not interested in spending less, and it is unable to spend more. There-
fore, at date 5 the procurement agency has no freedom of decision and oﬀers the
seller a procurement contract with price pi to be paid if the project is carried out.
Note that the agency cannot take the money pi, pay part of it to the seller and retain
the rest for personal emoluments. The agency rather has to forward all of the money
to the seller, since payments are veriﬁable and, accordingly, the agency could be sued
if it used parts of the budget for other purposes than for the particular public project.
Since the agency has no freedom of decision, at date 5 only the seller’s decision
counts. He compares two situations: if the project is carried out, he gets pi and
12Formally, the existence of an interior solution is ensured since expected welfare as deﬁned in
(11) is concave in the investments and the Inada conditions are assumed to be fulﬁlled.
10faces the production costs Cj. Otherwise, he has no production costs, and does not
get anything. Therefore, the seller will sign the project contract if and only if 13
pi − Cj ≥ 0. (14)
Let us now step back to date 4 where the project budget pi is determined. This
is the typical situation which Niskanen had in mind when developing his model of
bureaucratic behavior. Both parliament and agency have just learned the actual
realization of the beneﬁt of the project. The agency knows that the parliament is
willing to appropriate up to Bi/(1 + λ) dollars for the completion of the project,
recall the parliament’s constraint (7). Therefore, the agency makes a take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀer which equates the expenditures for the completed project to Bi/(1+λ). The






Bi/(1 + λ) if q = 1,
0 if q = 0.
(15)
Note that Bi is the project evaluation of the parliament, whereas pi(1 + λ) are the
social project costs which the parliament faces. The actual project costs Cj do not
matter for the parliament. It does not know them, and they are not explicitly rele-
vant for the project budget, because the Niskanen parliament cares only about the
evaluation of the project and not about the seller’s costs. When setting the project
budget at date 4, the parliament anticipates that the agency will oﬀer the seller a
project contract with pi = Bi/(1 + λ). It also anticipates that at date 6 pi dollars
will be paid to the seller if the project is carried out, and 0 dollars if it is not carried
out.
Let us ﬁnally investigate whether the decisions of parliament, agency and seller
attain project eﬃciency. The seller signs the contract iﬀ pi ≥ Cj. The project
budget has ﬁxed the expenditures for the completed project as to pi = Bi/(1 + λ).
Hence, although the seller does not know it, he signs the contract iﬀ
Bi
1 + λ
− Cj ≥ 0, (16)
which is equivalent to
Bi ≥ Cj(1 + λ). (17)
13This is also the participation constraint of the seller at date 5; the participation constraint of
the agency is pi ≥ 0 which is always fulﬁlled.
11Therefore, the seller signs the contract and the project is carried out if and only
if this is welfare-optimal according to our benchmark model. Project eﬃciency is
guaranteed.
There is an important diﬀerence between the project game of this paper and Niska-
nen’s original model. In Niskanen’s model the budget of the bureaucrat is expanded
until the parliament’s evaluation (budget) is equated to the costs of the project.14
In our setting we have a third player, namely the seller, and he retains the diﬀerence
between the parliament’s beneﬁt and the production costs as an ex-post rent. This
result is rooted in the agency’s budget-maximizing behavior. The highest budget
the agency can attain is given by the parliament’s beneﬁt Bi/(1 + λ). Therefore,
the agency will always make sure that the project budget is just equal to this ben-
eﬁt. Since payments are veriﬁable, however, the agency cannot encash a budget of
Bi/(1 + λ), pay Cj to the seller and retain the rest for personal emoluments. It
always has to spend all of the project budget, whence it is the seller who gets the
ex-post rent. It is remarkable that this mechanism works regardless of whether the
agency knows the production costs or not. If the agency knows the costs, it will not
plead for a lower budget of Cj, but for the higher budget of Bi/(1+ λ). And it will
have to pay all of Bi/(1+λ) to the seller because payments are veriﬁable. Therefore,
a procurement agency which observes the actual production costs will ‘throw away’
this information because it could only lead to a reduction of the project budget
which is unwanted by the agency. (This shows that all of our results hold as well
if the agency knows the production costs, which proves our statement in subsection
2.4 above.)
3.2 The seller’s investment decision (date 2)
When choosing his relationship-speciﬁc investments the seller anticipates the con-
tinuation of the game and maximizes the expected proﬁt given the agency’s invest-
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(1 + λ)
+ p0 − ψ(e), (18)
where the lump sum p0 is included in the objective function because it is encashed or
paid by the seller at date 2. The seller’s choice of speciﬁc investments is determined
14Ignoring Niskanen’s demand-constrained case.













which is equivalent to the benchmark welfare condition (13). Therefore, the seller’s
investment choice will lead to investment eﬃciency iﬀ the procurement agency has
chosen eﬃcient investments at date 1.
Unfortunately, however, only by chance will the agency choose eﬃcient investments
as we shall see in the analysis of the agency’s decision at date 1. We can distinguish
between two diﬀerent cases:
• The agency has chosen positive, but ineﬃcient investments, a > 0. In this case the
seller will overinvest if the agency has overinvested, and underinvest if the agency has
underinvested. The reason is the following. The agency’s overinvestment increases
the expected production rent of the seller and, therefore, the seller has an incentive
to invest more than welfare-optimal.15 An analogous argument holds if the agency
underinvests. Which of these two cases holds, will be seen when we explicitly treat
the agency’s investment decision at date 1.
• Assume that π(a) = π for all a. The agency has no incentive to invest and a = 0.
In this particular case of one-sided investments we attain investment eﬃciency, and
since project eﬃciency is always guaranteed, the (second-best) welfare optimum is
achieved.
3.3 Agency investments and the investment contract (date 1)
At date 1, the agency splits the parliament’s investment budget into a budget for
its own investments µ(a) and a lump sum p0 to be paid to, or encashed from, the
seller. However, at date 1 the agency knows that the parliament’s investment budget
amounts to zero (as we shall prove when stepping back to the discussion of the par-
liament’s decision at date 0). This implies that the budget for speciﬁc investments
of the agency can only be ﬁnanced from payments of the seller.
We assume that the agency is in a stronger position than the seller. Therefore,
the investment contract at date 1 is based on a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer the agency
15In formal terms: the agency’s overinvestment implies an increase of the left-hand side of (19),
which induces a higher value of the right-hand side, ψ0(e) and, hence, a higher investment e than
in the benchmark optimum.
13makes to the seller. Since the agency is a budget maximizer, it wants to maximize












When maximizing this objective function with respect to a and p0, the agency has to
consider the investment-budget constraint and the seller’s participation constraint:16
p0 + µ(a) = 0, (21)
U
S ≥ 0. (22)
What are the results of this optimization approach? The agency is interested in
attaining the highest possible amount of investments a, because higher investments
increase both the agency’s expected net beneﬁt from the project game and the
agency’s investment budget (which are the two components of the agency’s utility
UA). This can be achieved if the agency extracts all of the seller’s ex-ante rents,
equating US to zero by a negative p0, that is, by requiring the seller to pay for the
participation in the procurement game. The payment of the seller is then used to
ﬁnance the investment costs of the procurement agency,
|p0| = µ(a). (23)
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(1 + λ)
− ψ(e), (24)
where the value of e is given by (19). The right-hand side of (24) must never become
negative, otherwise the seller’s participation constraint would be violated.
Since at date 1 the agency has to decide on its own investment budget µ(a) and on
the seller’s lump sum p0, the extent of its investments is eﬀectively determined at
date 1. This implies that the agency serves as a Stackelberg leader in the investment
game, choosing its investments one stage before the seller. We recognize that the
lump-sum payment p0 is negative, that is, the seller has to pay for the participation
in the procurement game. In this case the agency will always overinvest (and so will
16The agency’s participation constraint does not cause any problems. As can be seen from
equation (20), the agency is always willing to sign the investment contract.
14the seller). This can be shown as follows. US = 0 implies (24). From the deﬁnition


















The procurement agency, however, has ﬁxed a payment of the seller according to
|p0| = µ(a). (27)
These two conditions are compatible if W(·)/(1+λ) = 0. As illustrated in ﬁgure 1,







a∗ a ˜ a
Figure 1: Overinvestment of procurement agency
3.4 The investment budget (date 0)
At date 0, the parliament wants to choose that budget b which yields ex-ante ef-
ﬁcient investments of agency and seller. Anticipating the agency’s overinvestment
problem at date 1, therefore, the parliament would like to reduce the agency’s invest-
ment incentives. This could be achieved by an investment budget b < 0. However,
the limited liability of the procurement agency only allows an investment budget of
b ≥ 0. Therefore, the parliament cannot chose an investment budget which induces
15the ﬁrst best. Instead, it chooses the lowest possible budget, b = 0, and has to
accept the overinvestment of the agency (and of the seller).
3.5 Does the general eﬃciency constraint W ≥ 0 hold? (date 0)
The whole game should only be played if at date 0 the general eﬃciency constraint
W ≥ 0 holds. Does the behavior of the parliament guarantee that this constraint is
always met? Unfortunately, this is not the case. Since it has a positive expectation
of the beneﬁt of the project, the parliament will always start the project, even if this
expectation falls below the sum of the expected production costs of the project and
the investment costs of the agency and the seller. The general eﬃciency constraint
will only hold if the project is characterized by a high expected social beneﬁt and
relatively low expected production costs and speciﬁc investment costs.
4 Summary
Bureaucratic behavior of public-procurement agencies a priori seems to exclude the
possibility of welfare-optimal procurement. However, as this paper shows, this is
not necessarily the case:
• First, if we assume one-sided investments of the seller, the seller will choose
welfare-optimal investments and the project will only be carried out if this is welfare-
improving. Hence, we have complete (second-best) welfare optimality in the case of
one-sided investments.17
• Second, both-sided investments of agency and seller can be attained if the seller
pays a lump sum for the right to participate in the procurement game which lump
sum is used to ﬁnance the investments of the agency. Both agency and seller will
necessarily overinvest in this case. This result is driven by the fact that the bureau-
cratic procurement agency maximizes its budget given the parliament’s willingness
to pay up to its evaluation of the beneﬁts of the project. Project eﬃciency will be
achieved in this case: after the investment costs have been sunk, only projects will
be carried out whose social beneﬁt (weakly) exceeds the production costs.
The positive results of the paper are driven by the parliament’s choice to appropriate
a project budget equal to the social beneﬁt of the public project. The parliament
knows that the bureaucratic procurement agency will never choose a smaller budget
17Assuming that W ≥ 0 at date 0.
16than these social beneﬁts (regardless of whether it knows the production costs or
not); it will pass on this budget to the seller whence the seller is oﬀered a price
which is equal to the social beneﬁt of the project. Since the seller will only sign the
project contract if this price is cost-covering, he decides in favor of the project if
this is welfare-improving and otherwise does not sign the project contract. There-
fore, the seller earns an ex-post rent which gives the correct incentives to induce his
project-eﬃcient decision. These ex-post rents, therefore, must not be taken away
from the seller. On the other hand, the procurement agency can fully extract the
ex-ante rents of the seller by stipulating a negative lump sum to be paid by the
seller for the right to participate in the procurement game.
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